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Synopsis: Based on recent ﬁndings from economics and the neurosciences, we present a conceptual
decision-making model that provides insight into human decision-making and illustrates how behavioral
outcomes are transformed into phenomena. The model may be viewed as a bridge between the seem-
ingly disparate disciplines of neuroscience and economics that may facilitate more integrative research
efforts and provide a framework for developing research agendas for scientists interested in human
behavior and economic phenomena.
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1. Introduction
‘How far will economics have to travel to reach solid behavioral ground?’
Daniel McFadden (1999, pp. 1–3)
‘But a scientiﬁc understanding of the human mind and human behavior in terms
of brain function could also have a profound impact on how we understand our-
selves and our society.’
M. James Nichols & William T. Newsome (1999a, p. C37)
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Explaining economic behavior is challenging. Why does the stock market crash?
Why are some countries poor? Why do we see extreme behavior after September
11, 2001 such as a reluctance to travel and stockpiling medicine (Schuster et al.
2001)? These are unanswered questions derived from a more basic question: What
shapes the world? The answer is simple and complex: The behavior of humans.
So, it seems natural to look at the decision-making process of humans to under-
stand economic phenomena. Understanding individual decision-making behavior
has received considerable attention in the economic literature. A major emphasis
has been the study of rational decision-making. Various researchers have shown
that rational behavior does not always coincide with actual behavior (Tversky &
Kahneman 1981). This observation has triggered research within the economic dis-
cipline that often is referred to as behavioral economics (Thaler 1997). Behavioral
economists explained anomalies, circumstances in which several assumptions of the
‘economic’ man are falsiﬁed due to less-than-full rational behavior (Camerer 1995,
Lewin 1996, McFadden 1999, Rabin 1998).1 However, their ﬁndings only seem
applicable in narrowly deﬁned situations (Rabin 1998, Thaler 1997). To better
understand complex phenomena like poverty that are, among other things, the
result of human behavior, one has to open the black box of the decision-maker’s
inferential machinery (Pennings & Garcia 2005). It seems therefore valuable for
economists to look at the recent ﬁndings in neurobiology and neurophysiology that
are beginning to discern how the brain transforms inputs (stimuli) into behavior
(Nichols & Newsome 1999b, Platt & Glimcher 1999).
Based on recent research in economics and neurosciences, we develop a concep-
tual decision-making model that provides insight into the steps in human deci-
sion-making and how behavioral outcomes are transformed into phenomena. The
framework is depicted diagrammatically interspersed with symbolic systems theo-
retic notation. The symbolic representation helps to formalize the arguments and
output of the processes and to see decision making from reception of stimuli to
actual behavior as a continuous and dynamic process in time t . The framework
may permit us to identify where research is needed and as such provides a new
research agenda for disciplines that study human behavior. Certainly, it should pro-
vide a platform to strengthen dialogue between economists and neuroscientists in
this intriguing area.
2. Conceptual model
The conceptual model can be viewed as a simultaneous interactive process in
which the decision-maker initially transforms stimuli to perceptions where per-
ceptions reﬂect the interpretation of stimuli. These perceptions are, among other
things, the input for the algorithm that decision-makers use to reach a choice.
After gaining insight into behavioral outcomes, we look at the interaction among
behavioral outcomes as this interaction also inﬂuences the individual decision-making
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process, creating dynamics. The combination of behavioral interactions drives the
phenomena of everyday life.
Figure 1 provides a general overview of the conceptual model. Figures 2 and
3 provide a more detailed depiction of the ‘stimuli-relay phase’ and the ‘dynamic
cognitive processing phase’.
Stimuli can be physical, such as pain and sun-light or can be a ﬂow of informa-
tion such as stock prices. These stimuli can be transformed into perceptions which
provide an individual’s interpretation of the information. Similar stimuli (e.g., the
news that IBM sold a division) might result in different perceptions (IBM is losing
market share by selling the division or IBM is earning money by the sale). Since
decision-makers are often confronted with numerous stimuli, not all information is
transformed to perceptions. In cognitive neuroscience, research has been performed
on how various regions of the brain respond to stimuli and how information pro-
cessing occurs (Waldrop 1993). Researchers have shown that the transformation
process of signals to the rest of the brain is determined by the neural activity cen-
tered in the thalamus (Clayton 2000). The transformations of stimuli in the thala-
mus are critical for perceptions (Andersen et al. 1997). All stimuli are ﬁrst relayed
to a speciﬁc part of the thalamus before projecting them to speciﬁc locations in
the cortex. In this way the thalamus functions as a ﬁlter and gatekeeper. These
ﬁndings support the existence of a ﬁlter mechanism that coordinates which signals
excite cells and are transformed to perceptions. This ﬁltering stage allows selective
processing of stimuli relevant to the current decision context (e.g., Figure 2). After
each stimuli reaches the appropriate cortex, the actual perception of stimuli goes
through the primary and then secondary sensory areas. The processing in the cor-
tex is performed in a parallel manner. Cellular physiological techniques revealed
that the trafﬁc between thalamus and cortex is bidirectional (i.e., the thalamus also
receives input from the cortex). The ﬁltered stimuli that are transformed to per-
ceptions ﬁll the multi-dimensional perceptual space (MDPS) which is located in
the posterior tertiary association cortex, the ﬁnal destination for transformed stim-
uli. In this phase, the decision-maker must simplify high-dimensional data onto a
low-dimensional structure. Tenenbaum et al. (2000) states, ‘The human brain con-
fronts the same problem (the problem of dimensionality reduction) in everyday
perception, extracting from its high-dimensional sensory inputs—30 000 auditory
nerve ﬁbers or 106 optic nerve ﬁbers—a manageable small number of perceptually
relevant features’. Perceptions will be complemented by information the decision-
maker has stored in his/her (working) memory. Long-term memory provides a res-
ervoir of information, often obtained by experience.
The stimuli-relay stage can be expressed in symbolic language. Deﬁne:
(t): the stream of stimuli a decision-maker confronts at moment t . The stream
of stimuli that arrives to the brain consists of high dimensional information that
varies widely in time. For instance, when sleeping reception is decidedly limited.
The ﬁltering operation is viewed as a mapping from high to a lower dimensional
stimuli space that is affected by memory:
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F((t),memory(t)) : ﬁlter on stimuli. (1)
The evolution of memory and/or experience through time is a speciﬁc process
where the input is the stream of relevant stimuli from the past to moment t . Its
development is essential for the way a person deals with information and is a stock
variable, a reservoir that stores experiences from the past. Memory is also used in
the transformation process of the stimuli-relay phase:
T[F((t)),memory(t)] : transformation of stimuli into perceptions (2)
The mathematical character of the stimuli space can be seen as a high dimen-
sional vector space where the intensity of reception by the cells can take on spe-
ciﬁc values. Perceptions, because of their complexity, need to be viewed as higher
dimensional objects which require abstract topological thinking to depict the char-
acter of their space. Regardless, the formed objects, the perceptions, stream into
the MDPS based on the ﬁltered stimuli.
The MDPS can be envisioned as the information space available to the deci-
sion-maker in order to develop a potential behavioral outcome that satisﬁes the
decision-maker’s objectives. Because the MDPS is very complex and the decision-
maker has limited processing and computational capability, the decision-maker
faces a difﬁcult challenge.
Perceptions are transformed into a behavioral outcome in the Dynamic Cog-
nitive Processing phase (DCP). (See Figure 3). The DCP phase consists of two
steps that complement and interact with each other: a computational step and an
intuition step. The computational step represents an analytical process in which
the decision-maker relates perceptions to the decision-maker’s objectives (Tremb-
lay & Schultz 1999). Speciﬁcally, the decision-maker processes information (e.g.,
perceptions) to determine an alternative outcome that ﬁts his (her) objectives.2
These objectives are the expected rewards (e.g., utility) of a behavioral outcome
(Platt & Glimcher 1999). Nichols & Newsome (1999b) suggest that when an
animal decides between two alternatives, both the choice made and the neu-
ral activation in the lateral intraparietal cortex are correlated with the expected
reward.
During the DCP phase, but particularly in the computational phase, three
cortical association areas in the brain play a crucial role: the parietal cortex,
the dorsolateral prefrontal area and a temporal area. The dorsolateral prefrontal
area plays the highest executive function of the brain, choosing between alterna-
tives and solving problems. All three areas interact and work together to achieve
the executive function. The DCP phase involves weighing numerous factors and
requires parallel activity in multiple networks of connections between the pre-
frontal cortex and other associated areas.
The computational step results in behavioral outcome alternatives. The behavioral
outcome alternatives ﬁll the behavioral outcome space (BOS). In the optimization
phase, which is part of the computational step (e.g., Figure 3), under the inﬂuence
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of memory, the BOS and the decision-maker’s objectives are used to select behav-
ioral outcome alternatives which become potential behavioral outcomes. The compu-
tational step approximates most closely economic modeling that describes human
behavior based on mathematical programming models where objectives (utility) are
optimized over a feasible set of alternatives. As such this is a convenient approach
to describe rational behavior.
When focusing on the DCP of generating alternative actions and deciding on ﬁnal
behavior, we view its input to be a stream of perceptions (t)∈ MDPS. As noted,
its structure deviates from standard vectorial numerical representation. In the calcu-
lation phase, algorithms are used to generate alternatives that gradually ﬁll the BOS.
This can be expressed as:
[BOS](t)=Comput((−∞, t ]),memory(t),objectives) (3)
Relevant objectives are used to value the alternatives, to distinguish what is feasible
and what is not. From a multi-criteria perspective, one could say that the calcula-
tion phase generates constraints on and criteria values for alternatives. This makes
it easier to consider the BOS as a set of numerical vectors that represent the poten-
tial alternatives, each element describing a value of a criterion (alternatively called
attribute, goal or objective). Note that decisions to wait for more information or to
allow more time for assessment of complex situations also are feasible alternatives.
The optimization phase weighs the alternatives and reduces their number. From
a multi-criteria perspective, dominated and infeasible alternatives can be removed
on an algorithmic, rational basis. The DCP phase also recognizes that alternatives
may emerge from outside the rational process due to intuition.3 In the optimiza-
tion phase of the DCP alternatives are selected that maximize utility subject to
BOS and intuition.
In symbolic language this leads to a potential behavioral outcome space:
Pot beh(t)=max(U(c(t)) subject to BOS(t), intuition) (4)
where we can think of Pot beh(t) as a set of alternatives at time t and where max
stands for maximizing, U(.) is a well-deﬁned utility function, c is the objective(s),
and BOS and intuition are the constraints. The maximization procedure is a multi-
criteria decision-making (MCDM) outranking procedure that eliminates the domi-
nated actions and yields the Pareto (with respect to BOS) ones (Belton & Stewart
2002). Figure 3 depicts the computational step in a step-wise manner, which is an
over-simpliﬁcation from a neurological perspective since many parts of the brain
are simultaneously involved during the computational step. Miller (1956) identi-
ﬁed physiological limitations on the pace at which humans can process informa-
tion. Recently, Vogel & Machizawa (2004) showed that although the human brain
is acutely aware of the many objects in the world, people are only aware of three
or four at any given time, demonstrating a direct relationship between brain nerve
activity and memory capacity. Vogel & Machizawa (2004) and Todd & Marios
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(2004) conclude that a person’s working memory capacity is determined in the pos-
terior parietal cortex. The notion that human’s processing capacity is limited, led
Simon (1955) to introduce the concept of bounded rationality. The concept states
that the capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex prob-
lems is small compared to the size of the problems that need to be solved for
objectively rational behavior to exist in the world.
The working memory in humans is considered vital to learning and reasoning,
and hence, is fundamental for the computational step (Fischbach 1992). When
information capacity limits occur we may expect that decision-makers will use
more simple algorithms and rely on less formal processes, i.e., intuition, since such
strategies require less information processing capacity. Intuition has been concep-
tualized in a number of ways. Khatri & Ng (2000) review some properties of
intuition; intuition is subconscious, complex, quick, not emotion, not biased, and
part of all decisions. Gehring & Willoughby (2002) showed how subconscious pro-
cesses can affect behavioral outcomes. Here, we follow a deﬁnition proposed by
Behling & Eckel (1991) where intuition is deﬁned as a choice made without for-
mal analysis. The deﬁnition identiﬁes the difference between the computational
step and intuition: the computational step is the analytical process, whereas the
intuition process can be viewed as a latent process that is running in the ‘back-
ground’ of the decision-maker, requiring less processing capacity than the compu-
tational step. Agor (1984) and Parikh et al. (1994) showed that managers use and
rely on intuition, particularly in decisions involving unstructured problems. In our
framework unstructured problems refer to situations when stimuli do not result
in clear and an unambiguous interpretations (e.g., perceptions are fuzzy), and/or
objectives in the computational step are not well deﬁned. Eisenhardt (1989, 1990)
and Bourgeois & Eisenhardt (1988) showed a signiﬁcant contribution of intuition
to the increased speed of decisions. We expect that intuition complements and
interacts with the computational step, providing extra ‘fuzzy’ information to the
MDPS and/or the decision-maker’s objectives. This extra information may change
the potential behavioral outcome generated in the computational step. Further-
more, intuition may be more concrete and lead to the development of alternative
potential behavioral outcomes. The feeling that ‘I know that I should choose A,
but my gut tells me to choose B′ may reﬂect such a situation. The notion of inter-
action between the two steps is supported by Zeki (1992) where he shows that
information (e.g., perception) does not travel along a single pathway, rather differ-
ent features of a single perception are processed in parallel pathways.
As visualized in Figure 3, the result of the interaction between intuition and the
potential behavioral outcomes generated in the computational step is a behavioral
outcome: an action of the decision-maker. In symbolic language,
Beh(t)= Ints(Pot beh(t), intuition) (5)
where Ints maps from the set of alternatives to Beh(t) the observable behavior at
time t .
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To this point, we have described the stimuli-relay phase and the DCP phase as
being sequential, that is ﬁrst the stimuli-relay phase occurs followed by the DCP
phase which can feed back to the stimuli-relay phase. However, we may expect
that both phases are performed by the decision-maker in concert. That is, the
decision-maker uses perceptions in the DCP phase while at the same moment ﬁl-
tering stimuli and giving interpretations to the stimuli (e.g., perceptions).
The DCP phase may require more information, and lead the decision-maker to
use information in the memory or reconsider several stimuli. Further, since there
is a continuous stream of stimuli and choice problems are rarely confronted in
isolation, decision-makers generate numerous behavioral outcomes in a parallel
manner. For each of these behavioral outcomes the decision-maker performs the
stimuli-relay phase and the DCP phase outlined above. The decision-maker might
use the same algorithm for different tasks, but some behavioral outcomes may be
more driven by the intuition step while others may need to be solved in the com-
putational step. Based on bounded rationality (Simon 1955), we hypothesize that
the capacity of the human mind for solving complex problems determines whether
the potential behavioral outcomes are mainly driven by the computational step or
by intuition. If the capacity of the human mind is relatively small (large) com-
pared to the size of the problem that need to be solved, intuition (computational
step) may be the main driver. Further, sometimes choices are made unconsciously
because they are routine. This means that these choices are driven more by intu-
ition as decision-making processes use ‘ﬁxed’ algorithms to solve repetitive prob-
lems. New or complicated problems may require the use the computational step
of the DCP phase intensively and require considerable processing capacity.
Decision-making is a dynamic and continuous process. Interactions and feed-
backs between the processes used to solve different problems are likely to occur.
Perceptions, algorithms or behavioral outcomes from decision process A might be
used as input in decision process B. Hence the decision-maker’s behavioral out-
come generation process is not smooth, and outcomes may appear chaotic and
not structured. Further, behavioral outcomes of a decision-maker interact with
behavioral outcomes of other decision-makers. This interaction or reaction may
result in new stimuli and hence a new round of the decision process (Mace 2000,
Nash 1950).The results of the interactions of decision-makers’ behavioral outcomes
and the institutions (rules of the game) that themselves are human constructs, are
the economic phenomena in society (inﬂation, stock market crashes, etc.). Human
social interactions are also inﬂuenced by ‘social intelligence’. An important compo-
nent of social intelligence is the capacity to understand and manipulate the men-
tal states of other people and thereby to alter their behavior (Frith & Frith 1999).
In our model, these social interactions provide further simuli to decision-makers.
Whether these stimuli will become a perception again depends on the ‘stimulus ﬁl-
ter mechanism’.
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3. Discussion
Arthur (1999) recently portrays economic phenomena as process dependent,
organic, and always evolving. Economic agents react to each others’ behavior and
by doing so the aggregate (phenomena) changes. In turn, as the aggregate changes,
the behavior of economic agents changes in response to these new stimuli, result-
ing in a constantly changing economic environment. Economic agents do not react
in a similar, pre-determined manner, instead choosing to respond strategically by
considering the possible outcomes that may result as a consequence of their behav-
ior. Nevertheless, in certain circumstances, where experiences and aspirations are
in common, and where the solution to the problem is direct such as in imper-
sonal markets, standard economic models may do a reasonable job of describing
and predicting outcomes. However, the usefulness of these models in explaining
and predicting behavior declines as the complexity of the economic phenomena
increases and decision-makers’ experiences objectives, and constraints become more
heterogeneous.
The proposed model, as reﬂected in Figures 1–3, may foster a better understand-
ing and may give new insights into perplexing problems. For example, from a neu-
rological perspective behavioral outcomes are driven by the interaction of neurons
in the brain (Platt & Glimcher 1999). Mayford et al. (1996), among others, show
that the anatomical connections between neurons develop according to a deﬁnite
plan, but their strength and effectiveness are not predetermined and can be altered
by experience. That is, the structure of the decision-maker’s decision-making process
may change over time. This offers an explanation to the ever-changing world. Sim-
ilarly, a topic that appears to puzzle many of us is poverty. Although the western
world has experienced booming economies and an unprecedented technological rev-
olution, billions of people are living in poverty and numerous people are dying each
day as a result of poor conditions. Why are people poor? Can we begin to resolve
this problem by a better understanding the decision making process? The proposed
model might contribute to answering these questions by providing a framework for
researchers to identify how the structure of decision making may vary across differ-
ent individuals, groups or cultures (e.g., Pennings & Garcia 2004). Furthermore, the
institutions in society, which are a product of human behavior, play an important role
in understanding economic phenomena. Hence economists may be able to use the
framework to structure their research questions to analyze the complex interactions
that cause economic phenomena. At the same time, neuroscience may beneﬁt from
the proposed framework as it models the brain as an economic system with goals
and constraints in order to predict both how behavior is generated (i.e. pathways) as
well as behavior itself (Glimcher 2003).
Above all, our framework may be seen as a bridge between seemingly dis-
parate disciplines that may permit more integrative and useful research efforts.
In this context, its use can help us relate theories across disciplines. For exam-
ple, Elliott et al. (2000) studied the neural responses of subjects participating in a
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gambling task similar to the experiments done by Tversky & Kahneman (1981).
They found increased activity in the right midbrain regions and the right ventral
striatum when individuals were winning, and an increased activity in the hippo-
campus and parahippocampus when subjects were losing. Prospect theory shows
that decision-makers are risk averse when winning and risk seeking when losing.
Breiter, et al. (2001) further elaborated on relating brain activity and prospect the-
ory when they mapped human hemodynamic responses to the expectation and
experience of monetary gains and losses. They found that a broadly distributed set
of brain regions was activated during the prospect phase and that these regions
were also activated during the outcome phase. Questions immediately emerge: Are
risk aversion and risk seeking behavior determined by speciﬁc regions in the brain?
Are differences in risk attitude, which research suggests is context speciﬁc, a result
of speciﬁc activation of different sites in the brain?
Similarly, the framework may provide a guide to develop research agendas of sci-
entists who are interested in human behavior and economic phenomena. For exam-
ple, preference reversals are one of the most impressive puzzles in the economic liter-
ature. In this puzzle, the decision-maker changes his/her decision without new infor-
mation. A classical example is the individual who chooses gamble A over B (or B
over A) but then states that his/her minimum willingness-to-accept price for A is less
(more) than the minimum willingness-to-accept price for B (Safra et al. 1990). Such
choice revealed preference reversals have been detected in several empirical studies.
Grether & Plott (1979) asked the following two questions: Do preference reversals
exist in a situation where economic theory is generally applied? Can preference rever-
sals be explained by applying standard economic theory or some related construct?
In their experiments, which closely followed the ‘gamble choice experiment’ described
above, they controlled for the factors that had been proposed as explanations for the
preference reversals, such as misspeciﬁed incentives, income effects, unsophisticated
subjects, etc. Although they controlled for all the economic-theoretic explanations
of the phenomenon, they had to answer the ﬁrst question with a clear yes and the
second with a clear no. Our model might suggest that the interaction between the
computational step and the intuition step in the DCP phase might cause this effect.
In some instances the potential behavioral outcome generated by the computational
step may be ‘overridden’ by the behavior outcome generated by the intuition step
causing these phenomena of preference reversals. When and how does this happen?
Economists may think of a framing effect (i.e., the nature of the decision context)
while neuroscientists may be think of information that is processed in parallel path-
ways in the brain (Pennings & Smidts 2003, Tversky & Simonson 1993, Williams &
Stuart 2002). This example suggests that if we want to understand how the world
is shaped and if we want to exercise inﬂuence on this shape, economists and neuro-
scientists should work closely together. This notion is further substantiated by the
recent ﬁndings of Smith et al. (2002) who found, using positron emission tomogra-
phy, that the brain does not honor a prevalent assumption of economics: the inde-
pendence of the evaluations of payoffs and outcomes. The proposed model is a step
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to bridge these seemingly distant disciplines, and can be viewed as a research struc-
ture to which both economists and neuroscientists can relate, thereby enhancing the
integration of these two disciplines.
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Notes
1. We do not review the immense literature on decision-making behavior exhaustively; Lewin (1996)
presents an excellent overview. Neither do we review the debate between economists and psychologists
on decision-making behavior (e.g., Camerer 1995, Rabin 1998).
2. Note that we do not assume all decision-makers to have the same objectives. Objectives can be
deﬁned on a local level, getting to Chicago in the fastest way, or on a very abstract level, do good for
the world.
3. Intuition is deﬁned as a choice made without formal analysis.
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